Since the 1980s, antitrust enforcement has retreated from its historical purpose. This was the result of a changing intellectual landscape in economics and law dating to the 1970s that advanced the belief that: (1) markets in almost every case are naturally self-correcting; (2) so-called consumer-welfare considerations (and low prices in particular) should take precedence over the welfare of workers, small businesses, vendors and suppliers; and (3) intervention in markets of any sort will inevitably only be counterproductive. The result of this influence that the American economy has become increasingly concentrated, income distribution has become more unequal, and economic opportunities have declined. These effects have been noticed and the pendulum has begun to swing back in the direction of more traditional antitrust policy goals. Thus, there is a need for wider economic and legal input in the debate about the future of antitrust.

Moreover, the dilution of effectiveness of the antitrust laws has led to greater emphasis and use of state and federal consumer protection laws. For example, following the Great Recession, Congress established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), tasking it with promoting fairness and transparency in mortgage loans, credit cards, debt collection, and other consumer finance. Despite some successes in consumer protection, the consolidation and power of giant money-center banks has continued. The growth of smartphones and online commerce has led to a new and complicated business landscape dominated by giant technology companies, as well as many smaller companies that use the global reach of the internet to perpetuate scams, identity theft, and other illegal activity. Economic analysis of these trends is a critical part of this debate. In the consumer protection area, economists study the consequences of asymmetric information in contracting, below-cost prices, and externalities. But little connection has been made between legal scholars in this sub area and economists.